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ANNE LEN

DivoJree-,JUidgJtuent--l~stoppel to Attack Dec:ree.-The validity
of a divorce decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance
thereon or
one who has aided another to procure the decree
so that the latter will be free to marry.
[2] Id. - Foreign Divorces - Estoppel. - A husband who went
through a
ceremony with full knowledge of the circumstances under which the wife obtained a foreign divorce
decree dissolving a prior marriage, and who lived with her as
husband for some time, is estopped to assert the invalidity of
such decree, the theory
that the marriage is not made
valid by reason of the estoppel but that the estopped person
may not take a position that the divorce or later marriage was
invalid; public policy requires recognition of the second marriage, and the principle of estoppel is applicable whether the
divorce decree was alleged to be invalid for lack of jurisdiction, or whether the second marriage took place before a year
after entry of a California interlocutory decree. (Disapproving Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal. A pp.2d 871 [185 P.2d 381];
Sullivan v. Sullivan~. 219 Cal. 734 [28 P.2d 914]; Estate of
Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 P. 439]; Dominguez v. Dominguez,
136 Cal.App.2d 17
P.2d 195]; and Parmann v. Parmann,
56 Cal.App.2d 67 [132 P.2d 851], insofar as they may be to the
contrary.)
[3] !d.-Temporary Alimony, Counsel Fees and Oosts.-Where a
husband is estopped to
the validity of a marriage which
took place before a year after entry of an interlocutory

--------------[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 148; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and
§ 482.
McK. Dig. References: [1]
§ 135; [2] Divorce, § 307;
[5] Husband and Wife,
Divorce, 179:
§ 7; [9] Marriage, § 32;
154; [ 6] Divorce,
§§ 60, 64; [12-16] Abuse
[10] Costs, § 37;
49; [18] Claim and Deof Process; [17] Costs,
livery,§ 78.

s

the wife is entitled
trial and on
declared valid and
for separate maintenance.
of Void Marria,ge--I.iability for Fraud
Inducing Marriage--Property Rights.-A wife's action
her husband for fraud
the
which took
'"'''"''~"''""" divoree de-

services render,ed.
[5] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Contracts.-A husband and wife may agree with each other as to their property
rights, and he is not liable for the support of her children by
a prior husband in the absence of an agreement, adoption or
some other arrangement.
[6] Divorce-Public Policy-Protection of Marriage Relation.Public policy seeks to foster and protect marriage, to encourage
parties to live together, and to prevent separation, but it does
not discourage divorce where relations between husband and
wife are such that the legitimate
of matrimony have
been destroyed.
[7] !d.-Public Policy-Contracts.-In the absence of fraud, collusion or imposition on the court,
policy does not prevent
parties who have separated from entering into a contract
disposing of their property
which shall become effective only in the event one
the parties obtains a divorce,
though such contract may be a factor in persuading a party
who has a good cause of action for divorce to proceed to establish it.
[8] Id.-Public Policy-Contracts.-A contract between an unmarried man and a married woman under which he promised to
divide his property with her and support her children if she
married him was not against public policy or promotive of
divorce where the divorce was merely incidental to the agreement, where the main purpose of the agreement was for support of the woman and her ehildren and division of property
in return for her entering into a Mexican marriage ceremony
which he led her to believe would be a valid marriage, and
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Marriage, § 26 et seq.; Am.Jur., Marriage,
§ 236 et seq.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 12 et seq.
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where the objects of the marriage had already been destroyed,
it was beyond saving when the promise was made, and there
was little likelihood of reconciliation with the husband.
[9] Marriage-Evidence.-A finding that a woman believed in good
faith that she was legally married to a man with whom she
entered into a marriage ceremony in Mexico was sustained by
evidence that her attorney told her that the marriage lay in an
"unsettled" field of law and he thought he could establish
estoppel and she took his word for it, and by evidence that,
notwithstanding she heard the court declare that the two were
not married at the hearing of a pendente lite support claim,
she filed notice of appeal from an order denying such claim
and continued to have intercourse with the man under the
belief that they were married.
[10] Costs-Taxation-Relief From Mistake.-Where the court
disallowed an item for preparing a reporter's transcript in
plaintiff's cost bill after a minute order had previously been
made ordering such transcript, the mistake was clearly one of
fact, and plaintiff's motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, to be
relieved from the order taken against her by mistake should be
granted where it was timely made after discovery of the mistake.
[11] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Orders Refusing to Vacate
Judgment or Order.-Ordinarily, an order denying a motion to
vacate a judgment or order is not appealable, but an appeal
may be taken from an order denying such motion where the
judgment was obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect.
[12] Abuse of Process-Evidence.-In an alleged wife's action
against her husband for abuse of process in having a claim and
delivery writ issued, resulting in the seizure of an automobile
when title thereto was at issue in plaintiff's main action, malice
could be inferred from defendant's conduct where such seizure
was done for the ulterior purpose of making things difficult
for plaintiff so she would drop her main action.
[13] Id.-Definition.-One who uses legal process, criminal or
civil, against another to accomplish a purpose for which it is
not designed is liable to the other for the pecuniary loss caused
thereby.
[14] !d.-Elements of Actionable Abuse.-The gravamen of an
action for abuse of process is not the wrongful procurement
of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil
proce€dings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was
designed to accomplish.
[15] !d.-Elements of Actionable Abuse.-The essential elements
of abuse of process are an ulterior purpose and a wilful act
in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct
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of the proceeding; the improper purpose usually takes the form
of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money by the use of the process as a
threat or club.
[16] Id.-Damages.-The compensatory damages recoverable for
abuse of process include mental suffering.
[17] Costs-Items Allowable- Attorneys' Fees: Damages- Attorneys' Fees.-Ordinarily, fees paid to attorneys are not recoverable from the opposing party as costs, damages or otherwise in the absence of express statutory or contractual author-

ity.
[18] Claim and Delivery-Costs and Expenses of Litigation.There is no express authority for the allowance of attorney's
fees in claim and delivery, and such fees may not be awarded as
damages in actions for the recovery of personal property.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from orders denying costs, support and
attorney's fees pendente lite, denying relief from order taxing
costs, and allowing attorney's fees. Orlando H. Rhodes and
Stanley Mosk, Judges. Judgments affirmed in part and reversed in part; order denying costs, support and attorney's
fees pendente lite during trial and on appeal, reversed except
insofar as they allow attorney's fees; order denying relief
from order taxing costs, reversed ; appeal from order denying
motion to vacatB order awarding costs and attorney's fees
on appeal, dismissed.
Action to have a marriage declared valid and for separatB
maintenance or in the alternative damages for fraudulent
representations, and for other relief. Judgment for defendant
reversed in part; portion of judgment allowing attorney's fees
in separate action for claim and delivery, reversed; other
portions of judgments, affirmed.
Leonard Horwin and Richard I. M. Kelton for Appellant
Annelen Spellens.
Reynolds, Painter & Oherniss, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross,
Pacht, Ross, Warne & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht, Clore Warne,
Stuart L. Kadison, Harvey M. Grossman and Ellis J. Horvitz
for Appellant Sol Carl Spellens.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, married to Robert Seymon, had
marital difficulties because of Robert's conduct; there were
two children of the marriage. While this condition exisred

214

C.2d

and she

marital
He promised
that when
he would marry
take care
of her and her children and make her a
in all of
his
tried to save her
with Robert
but was unsuccessful. In
she decided to divorce
Robert and defendant
for an
to represent
her and
funds therefor. She commenced an action
for divorce the next
based on extreme
After
the commencement of the
defendant conferred with
Robert about a property settlement and advised plaintiff to
waive her rights to any
property and all but a
nominal $1.00 per month alimony. This she did, and defendant again made the same
he had made before.
Plaintiff obtained an
divorce decree on March
13, 1951, and defendant represented that upon the granting
of the interlocutory decree he and plaintiff could be legally
married in Mexico and the marriage would be valid anywhere. He took her to Mexico where he obtained an attorney
who gave the same advice. Four days after the interlocutory
decree, plaintiff and defendant returned to Mexico and saw
the same attorney who was shown the decree and confirmed
his former advice. As a result of this advice plaintiff and
defendant were married in Mexico by the attorney, and they
began living
as husband and wife with plaintiff's
children as
of the
Plaintiff became pregnant by
defendant in 1951 and had a miscarriage. During the time
they lived together defendant was extremely cruel to plaintiff,
and in March, 1952, defendant suggested they separate, to
which plaintiff objected, but defendant said he had been
advised they were not
married. Plaintiff consulted
an attorney and was advised that the validity of her marriage
lay in the field of unsettled
but he thought defendant
would be
to assert its
Plaintiff thereupon
commenced her action
called main action) on
Jli[arch 24, 1952. The
for a brief period but
then lived
until defendant left her in September,
195~.

In an amended
asked that her marriage
be declared valid, that defendant be estopped to question its
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amendments
other
eauses of
and after au adverse
by the
(•ourt as to some of
a second amended complaint for
for fraud was filed. She
a division of the
rmnna-..f·y, and to be
ad litem
for their support on the
spouse. Defendant made
denials
and asserted as an affirmative defense that the marriage was
after the entry of an interlocutory decree but
void as
before the entry of a final decree of divorce and asked that
it be declared invalid.
The case was finally tried after various motions for support
and attorney's fees hereinafter mentioned. 'l'he court in its
findings recited that defendant raised the issue of the validity
of the marriage and by stipulation plaintiff was to make an
offer of proof thereon and on the pleadings and the offer the
court should decide that issue and determine whether defendant was estopped to deny its valiuity, as though such issues
had arisen through an objection by defendant to the introduction of any evidence by plaintiff; all facts pleaded and set
forth in the offer of proof were to be taken as true on those
issues, hence the question presented was one of law. Also
involved was the question of whether plaintiff could recover
on the agreement of defendant that he would validly marry
plaintiff, share his property with her and care for plaintiff
and her children if she married him. 'rhe court sustained
the objection to the introduction of any evidence on those
issues; the court then found the facts true on those issues; in
its conclusion of law it determined that the marriage was
invalid and no estoppel could exist. It also determined that
the "agreement" was invalid as promotive of divorce. It
granted plaintiff permission to file her second amended complaint. The trial proceeded, and the court granted a nonsuit
as to the first and third causes of action in the second amended
complaint which was for damages for defendant's fraudulent
representations and plaintiff's reliance thereon to her injury
and also for the reliance by herself and children on the misrepresentations of defendant as to their support and maintenance, holding as a matter of law that there could be no
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recovery for such fraud. The court then found that plaintiff
and defendant were well acquainted since 1947 and went
through a marriage ceremony in Mexico and from March
17, 1951, to September 22, 1952, they resided together as husband and wife and plaintiff in good faith believed the marriage
valid; that plaintiff would testify that her marriage with
Robert had failed; that plaintiff was of limited business and
no legal experience but defendant claimed much legal experience; that plaintiff trusted and had great confidence in defendant which vms fostered by him; that defendant made the
representations to plaintiff heretofore referred to in the statement of facts and intended that plaintiff rely thereon and
plaintiff relied thereon, marrying defendant, living with him
as a wife and having her children reside with them; that
defendant represented to friends, relatives and others that
they were married; that after the commencement of the action
herein the same conditions continued to exist except that
defendant represented to the court that the marriage was
invalid ; that during all of said time defendant knew the marriage was invalid and intended it that way which facts were
known exclusively by him; that plaintiff and defendant were
not legally married because of the lack of a final decree of
divorce; that defendant treated plaintiff with extreme cruelty
to her physical and mental prejudice; that during the time
plaintiff rendered valuable services to defendant in the belief
that she was his wife, and during said time defendant earned
$58,574 out of a total income of $79,244; that "by analogy to
the community property laws of the State . . . the residue of
the sums earned by . . . defendant . . . as the result of his
own efforts during the period commencing March 17, 1951,
and ending September 22, 1952, after deducting money spent
by way of quasi-community expense, is . . . $10,052.00 . . .
that included in said quasi-community expense and, therefore,
deducted by the Court in arriving at the balance of quasicommunity income on hand, is . . . $7,200.00 . . . which was
expended by the defendant . . . during said period in the
support of plaintiff's aforesaid minor children. . . . "
Accordingly judgment was entered determining the marriage to be invalid; that no estoppel existed and no damages
were recoverable 1 for defendant's fraud; that plaintiff was
the putative wife of defendant from March 17, 1951, to Sep'Pursuant to Civil Code, section 43.5(d):
"No cause of action arises for: . . .
"(d) Breach of promise of marriage."
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tember 22, 1952; that by reason of the latter fact and defendant's cruelty, plaintiff was entitled to all the "community" property
earned during the mentioned period),
plus $10,052, the balance of the "quasi-community property
after deduction of quasi-community expense"; that plaintiff
may not recover her attorney's fees incurred in the action;
that plaintiff should not recover on the other issues disposed
of on stipulation and objection to her evidence. Both plaintiff
and defendant appeal from the portions of the judgment unfavorable to each of them.
After commencing her action plaintiff had an order to show
cause issued why she should not be allowed counsel fees, costs
and support money pendente lite. The court denied any allowance on the ground that there was no valid marriage. She
appeals from that order of denial. She also asked for the
same allowances pending her appeal from that order and was
allowed attorney's fees on appeal but no support. She appeals
from the portion of that order denying her an allowance for
support. Defendant's motion to set aside the order fixing
counsel fees was denied and he appeals from that order.
Plaintiff contends that the defendant was estopped to deny
the validity of the Mexican marriage or, stated another way,
that he was estopped to deny that the California interlocutory
decree of divorce from Robert terminated that marriage and
made the Mexican marriage valid as far as he was concerned;
that thus the parties, as far as defendant and this litigation
is concerned, must be treated as husband and wife. Defendant contends that the strong policy of this state forbids the
establishing of an estoppel ;2 that no marriage contrary to
statute may be created by estoppel.
[1] The rule on estoppel is stated in Watson v. Watson,
39 Cal.2d 305, 307 [246 P .2d 19] : "To maintain his action
it is necessary for the plaintiff to deny the validity of the
Nevada divorce decree which he secured from his first wife .
. . . In Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 805 [221 P.2d
1, 20 A.L.R. 2d 1152], the court stated that 'tke validity of a
1
' ' A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life
of a former husband or wife of such person, with any person other than
such former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning,
unless:
'' 1. The former marriage has been annulled or dissolved. In no
case can a marriage of either of the partie~ during the life of the other,
be valid in this state, if contracted within on() year after the entry of an
interlocutory decree in a proceeding for divorce." (Civ. Code, ~ 61,
subd. 1.)
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divorce decree cannot be contested
a
who has procured the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance
thereon or by one who has aided another to procure the decree
so that the latter will be free to marry! The decisions in this
state and in other states are ample authority for the statement
in the Rediker case.
''The fact that in the present case it had been determined in a prior action that no marriage existed at the time
of the alleged tort does not benefit the plaintiff's position.
Such an eventuality was taken into consideration in Harlan
v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490]. Before their
marriage the plaintiff husband in that case had been instrumental in securing a Mexican divorce for the defendant from
her first husband. Thereafter the plaintiff sought an annulment of their marriage as bigamous, asserting that the Mexican divorce was invalid for want of jurisdiction of the court.
That situation is analogous to the present case in that in
bringing his action it is neeessary for the plaintiff to assert
the invalidity of a previous divorce obtained by him. In the
Harlan case the trial court found that the Mexican divorce
decree was invalid, as was the Nevada divorce in the present
case, and granted the annulment. In reversing the judgment
the court held that notwithstanding the fact that the Mexican
decree was invalid, the plaintiff was estopped from asserting
its invalidity because he had aided and counseled the defendant in procuring it. In the present case the plaintiff is likewise estopped from asserting the invalidity of the Nevada
divorce obtainod through his own machination. The fact that
he obtained that divorce as the party participant states a
stronger case against him than operated as an estoppel in
the Harlan case.
"In a decision by the New York Court of Appeals, relied
upon in the Rediker case, a defendant in a suit for separate
maintenance asserted as a defense that the marriage was
bigamous on the ground that a prior divorce he had obtained
from a Nevada court was invalid for want of jurisdiction of
that court. The New York court expressly assumed the invalidity of the divorce action but refused to let it be asserted,
stating that 'to refuse to permit this defendant to escape his
obligation to support plaintiff does not mean that the courts
of this State recognize as valid a judgment of divorce which
necessarily is assumed to be invalid in the case at bar, but only
that it is not open to defendant in these proceedings to avoid
the responsib,ility which he voluntarily incurred.' (Krause v.
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282 N.Y.
359-360 [26 N.E.2d 290].)" (Emphasis
added.) [2] It is said in Dietrich v.
41 Cal.2d 497,
505 [261 P.2d 2691: "On this record it is immediately obvious
that the very evidence offered to show the invalidity of the
ceremonial marriage was properly excluded because that same
evidence shows that Noah is estopped to assert the claimed
invalidity of the Nevada divorce [obtained by Carol from another man]. \Vith fun know ledge of the circumstances under
which that divorce was obtained, and in reliance on such divorce, Noah went through a marriage ceremony and lived
with Carol as her husband for many years. The public
policy of this state, in the circumstances of this case, as in
those considered in Rediker v. Rediker (1950), 35 Cal.2d 796,
808 [221 P.2d 1, 21 A.L.R.2d 1152], requires recognition of
the second marriage rather than the 'dubious attempt to
resurrect the original' marriage." (Emphasis added.) (See
also Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796 [221 P.2d 1, 21 A.L.R.
2d 1152] ; Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199 [155 P. 988,
Ann. Cas. 1917, 122]; Kelsey v. MiUer, 203 Cal. 61 [263 P.
200]; Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490];
Estate of Davis, 38 Cal.App.2d 579 [101 P.2d 761, 102 P.2d
545}; Hensgen v. Silberman, 87 Cal.App.2d 668 [197 P.2d
356]; In re Kyle, 77 Cal.App.2d 634 [176 P.2d 96); Adoption
of D. S., 107 Cal.App.2d 211 [236 P.2d 821] ; Estate of Oolenwn, 132 Cal.App.2d 137 (281 P.2d 567] ; Union Bank &
Trust Oo. v. Gordon, 116 Cal.App.2d 681 [254 P.2d 644] ;
Morrow v. Morrow, 40 Cal.App.2d 474 [105 P.2d 129]; 175
A.L.R. 538; 153 id. 941; 140 id. 914; 122 A.L.R. 1324; 109 id.
1018; Rest., Conflicts, § 112.) Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.
2d 871 [185 P.2d 381], insofar as it is to the contrary must be
deemed as disapproved. The theory is that the marriage
is not made valid by reason of the estoppel but that the
estopped person may not take a position that the divorce or
latter marriage was invalid. (Watson v. Watson, supra, 39
Cal.2d 305; Rediker v. Rediker, supra, 35 Cal.2d 796.) And
as to the public policy it is said: " 'To hold otherwise protects
neither the welfare nor morals of society but, on the contrary,
such holding is a flagrant invitation to others to attempt to
circumvent the law, cohabit in unlawful state, and when
tired of such situation, apply to the courts for a release from
the indicia of the marriage status.' (Harktn v. Harlan, 70
Cal.App.2d 657, 663-664 [161 P.2d 490} .) . . .
"Defendant contends, however, that the public policy of
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whenthe state
ever their bigamous character is discovered. W c find no basis
. . . Defor such a
of
fendant does not indicate how any
by the annulment of his
" 'It can no longer be said that
requires nonrecognition of all
foreign divorces. We have recognized that the interest of the state in many situations may lie
with recognition of such divorces and
of remarriages rather than a dubious attempt to resurrect the original.
From a pragmatic viewpoint,
invalidation of irregular foreign divorces and attendant remarriages, years after
both events, is a less than efrective sanction against an institution whose charm lies in its immediate respectability. We
think it may now be stated that the genet·al public policy in
this jurisdietion, as judicially interpreted, no longer prevents
application in annulment actions of the laches and estoppel
doctrines in determining the effect to be given such divorce
decrees.' (Vinson J., in Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753, 757;
Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 663-664 [161 P.2d 490];
Krattse v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 360 [26 N.E.2d 290].) We
conclude that the public policy of this state requires the
preservation of the second marriage and the protection of
the rights of the second spouse 'rather than a dubious attempt
to resurrect the original' marriage." (Rediker v. Rediker,
snpra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 806.)
The foregoing authorities involved an estoppel to deny
the validity of a decree invalid because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which purported to grant it but we think
the same policy requires the same result in the instant case
where there was a marriage before a year after the entry of
an interlocutory decree. The policy applies equally in one
case as the other. The policy against a bigamous marriage
expressed in the first sentence of section 61 of the Civil Code,
supra, involved in the cited cases, is no stronger nor more compelling than that involved here which is that there may not
be a valid marriage if contracted within less than a year after
the entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce. (Civ. Code,
§ 61, subd. 1, supra.) We fail to see any difference in this
case and one where defendant had participated in the obtaining of an invalid Nevada or Mexican divorce rather than a
California interlocutory decree. It is not the marriage
which is found valid as indicated by the aboye authorities and
thus the policy of section 61, subdivision 1, is not thwarted.

Oct.1957]

SPELLENS

v.

SPELLENS

221

[49 C.2d 210; 317 P.2d 613]

Rather it is that defendant by reason of his conduct will not
be permitted to
its validity or the divorce; so far as
he is
he and plaintiff are husband and wife. The
interlocutory decree declared that the parties were entitled
to a divorce and it was not unreasonable for plaintiff to have
been led to believr that a marriage in Mexico would be valid.
'l'he circumstances here clearly show fraud and estoppel as
far as the defendant is concerned; it would be difficult to
imagine a stronger case in this field of law.
The statement in Rediker v. Rediker, supra, 35 Cal.2d 796,
808, that the doctrine of estoppel "presupposes the entry of
final decree" and for that reason certain cases are distinguishable, does not lay down a rule contrary to the foregoing
conclusion; moreover if it seems to do so none is indicated in
the other and later authorities heretofore cited. Such cases
as Stdlivan v. Sullivan, 219 Cal. 734 [28 P.2d 914], Estate of
Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 P. 439], Dominguez v. Dominguez,
136 Cal.App.2d 17 [288 P.2d 195], and Parmann v. Parmann,
56 Cal.App.2d 67 [132 P.2d 851], do not discuss the theory of
estoppel and its essential poliey and results as announced in
the above discussed authorities; insofar as they may be contrary to the instant case they are overruled. The same might
be said of Anderson v. Anderson . 7 Cal.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290J,
and Brandt v. Brandt, 32 Cal.App.2d 99 [89 P.2d 171], but
in those cases there were no divorce proceedings to terminate
the first proceeding and hence they are distinguishable. The
out-of-state cases are not persuasive. An interlocutory decree
of divorce at least gives color as a judicial determination of
divorce especially when we consider that the final decree
ordinarily follows at the end of a year as a matter of course. 3
""Unlike other preliminary or interlocutory orders, the statutory
interlocutory decree in a divorce suit is final, except as against such
attack as is authorized by statute for the modification or vacating of
:final .iudgments. Such a decree, unless vacated on motion for new trial,
on motion under § 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or on appeal, is
a final adjudication of all matters therein decided, the final dissolution
of the marriage being the only question held in abeyance pending entry
of the final decree. If the interlocutory decree is regularly made and
correctly entered, it cannot be vacated on the bare application of the
plaintiff without notice to or consent of the defendant, even though the
defendant defaulted. lndeed, it is expressly prm·ided that after entry
of the interlocutory judgment. neither party has the right to dismiss
the action without the other'~ ~onRent.
''After the tinw to appeal or to move to vacate the decree has e.xpired, the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction to alter or set aside
the interlocutory judgment. While it has the inherent power to refuse to
enter a final decree dissolving the marriage, where it is made to appear
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It may be noted also that we are not

a common-law
marriage which does not exist in this state for the theory is
that the marriage is not validated; it is merely that defendant
cannot contest it. Thus the judgment must be reversed.
[3] It follows from the estoppel that plaintiff was entitled
to attorney's fees, costs and support
trial and on appeal (see Dietrich v. Dietrich, supra, 41 Cal.2d 497) as defendant is estopped to deny the validity of the marriage and
the orders with respect thereto must be reversed. These
matters will have to be determined by proceedings in the
lower court.
[4] Plaintiff's action for damages for fraud in inducing
the marriage (see, Langley v. Schttrnacker, 46 Cal.2d 601 [297
P.2d 977]) should not stand as she, by the estoppel, is receiving everything flowing from a valid marriage and we apply
the same law as if they were validly married; this is conceded by plaintiff as she states in her brief: "On this appeaL,
the issue of whether California abolished the right of a woman
who is fraudulently induced into a void marriage to sue for
her injury is only reached if this Appellate Court holds that
no valid marriage exists between the parties. If the Appellate
Court agrees with Annelen that the parties are legally married, this question is moot." That includes the situation
where estoppel may exist as we have indicated it does.
The same comments are true with regard to plaintiff's claims
of property rights by reason of a putative marriage and
compensation for wifely services rendered; defendant is
estopped to deny the existence of a valid marriage and hence
plaintiff must rely on rights which flow from a marital relationship. Being in such a position she should not be entitled
to anything for services as defendant's wife.
Plaintiff's action on the alleged oral agreement that defendant promised plaintiff both before and after the commencement of the divorce action vvhich resulted in the interlocutory
decree from Robert that if she would divorce Robert and
marry him he would divide all his property with her and
support her children presents, however, a different question.
that on a condonation of the ofl'ense on which the interlocutory judgment
was based the parties resumed the maritnl relation. it does not follow that
the court, after the lapse of a year, has jurisdiction to vacate an interlocutory judgment, the integrity of which, insofar as it determines the
facts properly involved therein. is unaffected by subsequent relations
of the parties. The facts having been thus finally adjudicated, the
judgment can be set aside only by a proceeding in the nature of a direct
attack." (16 Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, ~ 127.)
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A husband and wife may agree with each oth~: as to
their property
and of course defendant is not liable
for the support
plaintiff's children by Robert in absence
of an agreement, adoption or some other arrangement. She
might under such an agreement obtain an interest in defendant's separate property as well as the community property
as support for her children by Robert to which she would
not otherwise be entitled. Here the court nonsuited plaintiff
on her action on the agreement on the ground that it was
promotive of divorce and hence void and unenforceable. The
court stated, however, "May I point out here, to you, that the
Plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's promises are [sic]
clear? In cross-examination they are perhaps whittled down
somewhat, but it would be wholly improper for me to find he
did not make such promises from this state of the evidence•
. . . You may presume that the promises were made. My
problem is, what is the effect of the promises 1 What is public
policy in permitting recovery under such promises?" The
court found that: "The parties stipulated that the plaintiff
would testify that during all of the time . . . to and including the date of the decree of divorce between plaintiff and
Robert Seymon, the ends of matrimony between plaintiff and
Robert Seymon had been defeated and the Seymons were
existing in a state of discordance and unhappiness." 'fhe
evidence shows that defendant made his promises both before and after the divorce action was commenced. There is
sufficient evidence from which it could be found that defendant made the promises repeatedly and in part so that if she
would marry him he would divide his property with her and
support her children; as a part of his promises she was
induced to claim no alimony from Robert (except a nominal
sum) and no community property.
Plaintiff contends that since the promise was made after
plaintiff decided on a divorce and had grounds therefor, the
objects of that marriage had ceased and the agreement is
enforceable; that in any case the agreement as to the support
of the children is not void and is severable from the rest of
"'Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property,
which either might if unmarried . . . . " (Civ. Code, ~ 158.)
"A husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter
their legal relations, except as to property and except that they may
agree, in writing, to an immediate separation, and may make provision
for the support of either of them and of their children during such separation." (Emphasis added; Civ. Code, 4 159.)
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the agreement. Defendant contends that part of the agreement was that plaintiff would obtain a divorce from Robert
and the fact that an action for divorce from him had matured
and been commenced makes no difference since before the
interlocutory decree and even thereafter there was the chance
plaintiff and Robert would be reconciled.
[6] Regardless of what the authorities may have heretofore stated in regard to the validity of an agreement made
in contemplation of a divorce, a recent statement by this
court of the general policy on this subject, is pertinent here:
"Public policy seeks to foster and protect marriage, to encourage parties to live together, and to prevent separation.
[Citations.] But public policy does not discourage divorce
where the relations between husband and wife are such that
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly destroyed. [Citation.] [7] In the absence of fraud, collusion or
imposition upon the court, public policy does not prevent
parties who have separated from entering into a contract disposing of their property rights which shall become effective
only in the event one of the parties obtains a divorce, even
though such a contract may be a factor in persuading a party
who has a good cause for divorce to proceed to establish it."
(HiU v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417] .) In Howard
v. Adams, 16 Cal.2d 253, 255 [105 P.2d 971, 130 A.L.R. 1003],
the contract was by appellant aunt to support plaintiff, her
niece (who was married) and was: "Her [appellant's] conversation with plaintiff at this time, according to the latter's
testimony was as follows: Plaintiff: 'I had driven over to my
aunt's home with my three children; and I walked into her
bedroom; and my aunt said, ''My heavens, what has happened
to your eyes?" I said, "Homer [plaintiff's husband] has
blackened both my eyes; he has beat me up all over my body
and threatened to kill the children; I am afraid of him; I
cannot live with him any longer; I am going right down now
to see an attorney and get a divorce." My aunt said, "You
can't do that here; think of my banks; think of the Baldwin
name having any scandal here"; and I said, "I have heard
if I go to Reno, Nevada, to get a divorce, I can't get alimony."
My aunt said, "Never mind about that; if you do that and
go to Reno, Nevada, and get a divorce, I will support you the
rest of your life ; I will take care of the children and I will
educate them." . . . I said that for her sake that I would do
what she asked me to do.' " The court held that since plaintiff had already decided on the divorce and had grounds
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therefor before the agreement was made it was not invalid.
Hill v.
supr·a, 23 Cal.2d 82, 90; see Bradbnry v.
Bradbury, 52 CaLApp.2d 547 [126 P.2d 673]; Bm·ham v.
33 Cal.2d 416 [202 P.2d 289]; De Burgh v. De Burgh.
39 Cal.2d 858 [250 P.2d 598].)
[8] We think the evidence was susceptible of an interthat the divorce from Robert was
incidental
gr<~enlentt; that the main purpose of the agreement
was for support of plaintiff and her children and division of
""'·""·""'" in return for her entering into a Mexican marriage
ceremony with defendant which he led her to believe would
be a valid marriage so that she as his wife and her children
could live with defendant, and that the objects of the marriage
with Robert had been destroyed and it was beyond saving
when the promise by defendant was repeated; that there was
! ittle likelihood of reconciliation with Robert and the agree·
nwnt did not bar such possibility. As so construed the agreement would not be against public policy or promotive of
divorce. Of course since a nonsuit was granted, we are only
eoncerned with the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a
prima facie case on behalf of plaintiff. 5 While the foregoing
authorities and those cited by defendant are not factually
the same, we believe that reason and justice require the
reversal of the judgment as to the oral agreement.
Plaintiff also complains that there should not have been
any deduction from the award of community property to
her of the sums used for her and her children's support
during the period she and defendant lived together. That
portion of the judgment cannot stand because of our decision
as to estoppel and the validity of the support agreement. This
changes the entire theory of the case and those matters will
have to be redetermined on retrial in the light of our holding
here. What action the court may take with reference to the
agreement we cannot know inasmuch as a nonsuit was incorrectly granted and the matter is open for further proceedings.
[9] Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support the finding that plaintiff believed in good faith in
the validity of her marriage to defendant between March 17,
1951, and September 22, 1952, at least after she consulted
"It may be mentioned that defendant did not plead the statute of
frauds or objeet to the introduction of evidence of a.n oral agreement;
what may be done on retrial we cannot foresee.
~C.JQ-8
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told
field of law and he
took his word for it. The court was justified in drawthe inference it did. Defendant further mentions that
could not so believe after the court declared
were not married at the
on the
lite support
claim on
1952. She
from the order of denial
and testified that she still believed she could
as valid and the court later in
order
be reversed on
and the
was iu
good faith. Plaintiff testified on cross-examination : '' Q.
Nevertheless,
the fact that you filed this lawsuit against
Mr. Spellens, you continued to have sexual intercourse with
Mr. Spell ens f That is correct, is it not? A.
because in
my way of thinking, we were married. . ..
"Q. And that continued for some months, did it not 1 A.
Yes.'' During the course of the trial on March 4, 1953,
Annelen testified: "I am still sure I am married to Mr.
Spellens.'' These facts and circumstances and this testimony
amply support the finding that plaintiff believed in good faith
that she and defendant were legally married up to the date
of their final separation on September 22, 1952.
[10] Plaintiff appeals from a denial of her motion to vacate
an order of the trial court striking or taxing the item of costs
claimed in her cost bill of $220.60 for a daily reporter's transcript of the proceedings. 6 Plaintiff filed her cost memorandum including the item. Defendant moved to tax them. He
objected to the item stating in his memorandum of points and
authorities that reporter's fees for a daily transcript are not
allowable unless ordered by the court and the court did not
order them here. The court disallowed the item saying plaintiff was not entitled to it. However, a minute order had been
previously made by the court during the trial which stated:
''A daily transcript is ordered.'' Plaintiff moved to vacate
the order taxing the item on the ground of mistake as to the
existence of the minute order. In the uncontradicted affidavit
of plaintiff's counsel it is stated that he was mistaken as to
•• 'In civil eases the fees for reporting and for all other transcriptions
ordered by the court to be made shall be paid by the parties in equal
proportion, and either party at his option may pay the whole. In either
case, all amounts so paid by the party to whom costs are awarded shall
be taxed as costs in the case." (Gov. Code, § 69953.) There is thus
no question that if the transcript was ordered by the court the cost
eould be reeovered by the party entitled, plaintiff.
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discoyer it until the clerk's transcript on appeal was pre; that at the time of the argument on the motion to tax
the court
its intention to allow the item if the law
'l'he motion to vacate was denied and plain.
Plaintiff relies on section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure7 and a claimed inherent power in the court to correct
v. 0
63 Cal.App. 620 [219 P. 467],
its orders. In
the court held there was a case for relief for mistake under
section 473 where there was a mistake as to the amount of the
costs included by the one entitled thereto. It is said in
Lane v. Pacific
Lines, 30 Cal.2d 914, 916 [187
P .2d 9] : "It is plaintiffs' position that the trial court had
no power to grant defendants relief from default and permit
them to file the second motion to tax costs. They argue, first,
that section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure can have no
application to a motion to tax costs because such a motion is
not a pleading within the language of the section which provides that application for relief 'must be accompanied by a
copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed.' It
is settled, however, that, under the provisions of section 473,
the court may relieve a party from the effect of a delay in
taking procedural steps which do not involve pleadings. (See
Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 394 [143 P. 697] ; Pollitz v.
Wickersham, 150 Cal. 238, 243 [88 P. 911].) Relief from
default has been allowed under the provisions of section 473
where a party failed to file a eost bill within the times provided in sections 1033 and 1034 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Soda v. Marriott, 130 Cal.App. 589, 594 [20 P.2d
758]; Potter v. City of Compton, 15 Ca1.App.2d 238 [59 P.2d
540]; Kallmeyer v. Poore, 52 CaLApp.2d 142, 153 [125 P.2d
924].) Insofar as granting relief from default in filing is
'"The court may, upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party
or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus·
able neglect. Application for such relief must be accompanied by a
copy of the answer or other plealling proposed to be filed therein, other·
wise the application shall not be granted, and must be made within a
reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such judgment,
order or proceeding was taken.
"The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion,
correct clerical mi~takes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to
conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either
party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or
order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.)
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concerned, there appears to be no reason for making a distinction between a cost bill and a motion to tax costs.''
We see no reason why if the timeliness of filing costs proceedings may be reached by section 473, a mistake clearly
one of fact as to what the court had done with reference to
making the cost item allowable, should not likewise be covered by the first sentence of the
of that section.
'fhe action here in
the item for the transcript was
in the language of that portion in that it was an order taken
against him through his mistake. The court had power to
decide the question and should have done so. We do not have
a case of judicial error but merely one of mistake of fact as
to what the court had done.
[11] There has been some question whether an order denying relief under section 473 in a case where relief may be
asked properly under that section is appealable. The correct
rule is stated: " . . . when a judgment or order is not appealable, it cannot be made reviewable by the device of moving
to set it aside and appealing from an order denying the motion. This proposition stems from the rule that forbids a
party to do indirectly what he may not do directly. Even
where there is a right of appeal from a judgment or order, a
party cannot ordinarily take an appeal from a subsequent
order denying a motion to vacate the judgment or order complained of, under such circumstances that the motion merely
calls upon the court to repeat or overrule the former ruling
on the same facts. And if the grounds upon which the parties
seek to have a judgment vacated existed before the entry of
the judgment and would have been available on an appeal
from the judgment, an appeal will not lie from an order refusing the motion. The party aggrieved by a judgment or
order must take his appeal from such judgment or order itself, if an appeal therefrom is authorized by statute, and not
from a subsequent order refusing to set it aside. The reason
for denying an appeal in the latter case is not because the
order on the motion to vacate is not within the terms of the
statute allowing appeals, for it may be. Indeed, an order
refusing to vacate a final judgment is in its very nature a
special order made after judgment. But the right of appeal
from the order is denied because it would be virtually allowing two appeals from the same ruling, and would, in some
cases, have the effect of extending the time for appeal, contrary to the intent of the statute. A further reason is that the
order on the motion is merely a negative action of the court
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uc'l'UJliHlts to disturb its first decision.
The first decision being
reviewable, the refusal any number of times to alter it does
not make it less so." (3 Cal.Jnr.2d, Appeal and Error, §57.)
". . . . And since a statute [Code Civ. Proc., § 473]
makes express provision for a motion to vacate, an appeal may
be taken from an order denying such motion where the judg·
ment has been obtained through mistake, inadvertence, suror excusable neglect. In every case where this course has
been allowed, the order from which· the appeal was permitted
was technically within the class of orders made directly appealable by statute, that is, a special order after final judgment. In permitting a direct appeal, therefore, the court was
merely relieving the appellant from a rule of practice to the
effect that an order refusing to vacate a prior appealable
order, although described as appealable by the statute, could
not be made to take the place of an appeal from the original
order." (3 Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, §58.) (See also
Witkin, California Procedure, vol. 3, pp. 2170- 2173.)
Here the relief sought is not to have the court reconsider exactly what it had considered before on the cost bill;
it is asked to consider that there was a mistake of fact when
it made its cost order, and it considered the fact as contrary
to what the record shows ; that is not an effort to extend the
time of appeal or obtain an appeal where none was available.
The court must pass upon the question of the mistake and
factors involved in relief under section 473. The appeal from
the order of denial was therefore proper and the order must
be reversed.
There may be some question whether the minute order for
a daily transcript above referred to was the court's own
order or because of a request by plaintiff; that is a matter
that should be determined on reconsideration of the cost bill
and order taxing costs.
[12] After the main action was commenced and was at issue
in which the property rights of the parties were involved, defendant brought an action against plaintiff to recover possession of certain personal property ;8 plaintiff cross-complained claiming damages for ''abuse of process'' in the use
of the provisional remedy of claim and delivery by defendant
in that action for possession. The trial was consolidated
with the main action heretofore discussed. The court found

"The parties will still be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as they
are in the discussion of the main action.
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that defendant was the
which was
of an automobile, which was a
tiff, but it was the
defendant
tofore ULC;llLLV>"lC:U
action
involved in the main action and caused a claim and
writ to issue and be served; that he had the sheriff come to the
house with his writ where
was
was
also
and served the writ and
the automobile and took an
of the
claimed in the
all without
consent. Plaintiff got in touch with her
but the sheriff remained for
several hours at the house and would not leave without the
property until
counsel obtained an order enjoining
him from seizing the property. While the sheriff and defendant were there defendant said he would drop his proceeding for claim and delivery if plaintiff dropped the main
action, that the action and claim and delivery proceedings
caused plaintiff anguish and mental suffering to the damage
of $500, together with punitive damages of $1,000 and $1,500
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in stopping the furtherance of the claim and delivery writ. Judgment accordingly
followed from which defendant appeals. Defendant had deposited a cash undertaking of $16,000 in the claim and delivery proceeding and after entry of the judgment he moved
to exonerate the undertaking. The court exonerated it to
the extent of $12,000.
'rreating the action as one for abuse of process it appears that the evidence is sufficient to support the findings
and malice may be inferred from defendant's conduct, if it is
required, in such an action or to make a case for punitive damages. While the sheriff did not actually seize the property
except the automobile, he served the writ and in effect seized
it, and it may be inferred that he was interfering with plaintiff's property right. The automobile was seized. Plainly it
was done for the ulterior purpose of making things difficult
for plaintiff so she would
her main action. It was like a
threat, not really to obtain possession of the property which
he claimed as his own, but to coerce her with regard to the
main action.
[13] The rule with reference to the tort involved is stated
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P.2d
in Tranchina v. n·'"""''"'"·
of Torts,
: ''This tort is thus defined in 3
section 682, page 464 :
" 'One who uses
whether criminal or civil,
against another to
a purpose for which it is not
designed is liable to the other for the
loss caused

'Comment:
[14] " 'a. The gravamen of the misconduct for which the
liability stated in this Section is imposed is not the wrongfu]
procurement of
process or the
initiation of
criminal or civil proceedings ; it is the misuse of process, no
matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that
which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly
that it was obtained
in the course of proceedings which were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose or even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating
them. The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly
obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the liability
is imposed under the rule stated in this Section.'
''So in 1 Cooley on Torts, fourth edition, section 131,
pages 434-435 we read: 'If process, either civil or criminal, is
wilfully made use of for a purpose not justified by the law,
this is abuse for which an action will lie. The action will lie
although the process was lawfully issued upon a valid judgment for a just cause and is valid in form. The grievance
for which redress is sought arises in consequence of subsequent acts-the illegal and malicious abuse of the power conferred by the judgment and writ.'
"The rule is similarly stated in Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237
N.Y. 384 [143 N.E. 229, 231) by Mr. Justice Pound of the
Court of Appeals:
" 'The gist of the action for abuse of process lies in the
improper use of process after it is issued. To show that regularly issued process was perverted to the accomplishment of
an improper purpose is enough.'
"To the same effect are 50 C.•T. 612; 1 Am .•Jur. 176; Prosser
on Torts, § 98, p. 892 et seq.; Ooplea v. Bybee, 290 IH.App.
117 [8 N.E.2d 55); Ash v. Oohn, 119 N.J.L. 54 [194 A. 174];
8aliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402 [172 A.
; Defnall v. Schoen,
73 Ga.App. 25 [35 S.E.2d
; Ellis v. Wellons, 224 N.C.
269 [29 S.E.2d 884]; Nix v. Goodhill, 95 Iowa 282 [63 N.W.
701, 58 .Am.St.Rep. 434] : Kool v.
43 Utah 394
P.
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906] ; and cases collected in the notes in 80 A.L.R. 580 and 86
Am.St.Rep. 397; and cf. the dictum in Crews v. Mayo, 165
Cal. 493 at p. 495 [13 P. 1032] . . . . Whether malice is a
necessary element of this tort has been questioned (50 C. J.
616-617; 1 Am.Jur. 179-180) but if malice is a necessary element it is settled that it may be inferred from the wilful abuse
of the process (50 C.J. 616; 1 Am.Jur. 192 Prosser on Torts,
893-894; Oople.a v.
supra, 290
117 [8 N.E.2d
55, 59) ; and cases collected in 80 A.L.R. 582)." (Emphasis
added.) Dean Prosser, University of California School of
Law, has the following to say with the citation of many authorities: ''The action for malicious prosecution, whether it be
permitted for criminal or civil proceedings, has failed to provide a remedy for a group of cases in which legal procedure
has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause,
and even with ultimate success. but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not
designed. In such cases a tort action has been developed for
what is called abuse of process ....
"Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution
in that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action
or causing process to issue without justification, but mismdng
or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other
than that which it was designed to accomplish. The purpose
for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only thing
of importance. Consequently in an action for abuse of process
it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the proceeding has terminated in his favor, or that it was obtained without
probable cause or in the course of a proceeding begun without
probable cause ....
[15] "The essential elements of abuse of process, as the
tort has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior
purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at
an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is
required; and there is no liability where the defendant has
done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized
~onclusion, even though with bad intentions. The improper
purpose 1tsu.ally takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding
itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of
money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club. There
is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done
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issuance or
constitutes the tort.
p. 667.
This

.,...,."""'""'-" under the claim
recent discussion
this
to the recovery
of
fees under various circumstances states the general rules: "
fees
to
are not recovor otherwise,
erable from the
in the absence of express
contractual authority.
Section 512 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
sets forth the
of the
to be furnished
in claim and
to the defendant 'of such sum as may from any cause be recovered against
the
' Section 667 of the Code of Civil Procedure
permits either the
defendant in a replevin
action to recover
of the property
or its value
for its taking and
detention.
[18] "It is clear that there is no express authority for the
allowance of
fees in claim and delivery, and the
cases have
refused to award such fees as damages in
actions for the recovery of
property." (Le JJ'ave v.
Dimond, 46 Cal.2d
870
P.2d
.) What is there
said is
we are dealing with the tort of
abuse of process rather than where an ultimately unsuccessful
We find no statute or
plaintiff uses claim and
contract allowing
fees
such torts and thus the
judgment in that action must be reversed to that extent.
The orders
support and attorney's fees
pendente lite
trial and on appeal except insofar as they
on appeal are reversed; the
allow attorney's fees to
in the main action is reversed in the respects heretofore indicated; the order
relief under section 473 of
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the Code of Civil Procedure from the order
versed ; the
of the
in the action for claim and
of
and abuse of process, is reversed. In all other
respects it is affirmed. 'l'he appeal from the order denying
defendant's motion to vacate the order
costs and
's fees on
is dismissed. Plaintiff shall recover
her costs on all
and

concurred.

SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Estoppel to
Deny tke Validity
the i1l exican
I agree that the
extension of the doctrine of estoppel to the facts of this case
is appropriate, but I would make it unmistakably clear that
here the marriage in respect to which the doctrine is being
applied is absolutely void ab initio.
The conclusion in this respect is reached through reasoning
as follows: Where the parties go through a marriage ceremony
in reliance upon a void decree of divoree their marriage is no
more ''valid'' than the marriage of the parties here where
there was no judgment of divorce. 1 Therefore, as the opinion
of Justice Carter indicates, public policy against bigamous
marriage is no more disserved by a holding that defendant is
estopped to deny the "validity" of the marriage here than it
is by the more familiar holding that ''The validity of a divorce
decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured the
decree or a party who has remarried in reliance thereon, or
by one who has aided another to procure the decree so that
the latter will be free to remarry." (Rediker v. Rediker
(1950), 35 Cal.2d 796, 808 [7] [221 P.2d 1].) Note, however,
that in the Rediker case, at page 808, we stated, "Since the
application of the doctrine of estoppel presupposes the entry
of a final decree, cases involving remarriage after the entry
of only an interlocutory decree (SuUiva.n v. Sullivan, 219
Cal. 734, 736 [28 P.2d 914] ; Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339
[132 P. 439] ) , or with the first marriage unaffected by any
1
Here there was an interlocutory decree but it is indisputable that,
in this state, the interlocutory decree entered in a divorce action is in
no sense a judgment of divorce. It neither purports to nor can affect
the legal status of the parties as husband and wife. It is merely a determination, in so far as status is concerned, that a divorce ''ought to be
granted" and that one party or the otl1er or both, after the expiration
of a year from enh·y of the interlocutory decree, shall he ''entitled to a
divorce." (Civ. Code. ~§ 131, 132; De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952), 39

Cal.2d 858 [250 P.2d 598].)
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7 Cal.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290] ;
99 [89 P.2d
) , are not
In

"
Broad statements to the effect that
of a

favors the
eveu at the suit
Anderson
),
Sullivan (1934),
; Sullivan
) , made without reference to the
should here yield to the apposite policy,
stated as a conclusive
in the Code of Civil Procedure ( § 1962, snbd.
that "Whenever a party has, by his
or omission, int<:>ntiona11y and deliberown
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."
Defendant with full knowledge of the faets led plaintiff to
going through a bigamous marriage ceremony
believe that
she was acquiring the status and incident rights of a lawful
wife. He should not now be permitted to rely, to her injury,
upon her innocent bigamy.
It appears pertinent to observe that caution should be
exercised in applying the doctrine of estoppel in favor of one
spouse who goes through a bigamous marriage ceremony durthe interlocutory period, i.e. after entry of the interdecree determining riohts but before granting or
entry of the judgment of divorce, which alone affects the
marital status. Plaintiff's ignorance of the invalidity in
California of th,, Mexican marriage is conceivable in the circumstances of her lack of experience, defendant's representations as to his wide experience, and the facts that she relied
upon defendant to and defendant did arrange for her procm·ing the interlocutory decree establishing her right to obtain
a judgment of divorce after the one year waiting period
and the advice of the Mexican attorney as to the validity of a
Mexican marrhcge. Although it is obvious that a court should
scrutinize with caution a claimed belief that an interlocutory
decree which is incompetent to affect status permitted a rein another jurisdiction before expiration of the waiting period, until which time neither party was even entitled
to
for the
of divorce in Califomia, a plaintiff's
of the facts
the invalidity of the void 2
•As already mentioned, it must be recognized that here the mar:riage
is void, as distinguished from merely voidable, (See Civ. Code, §§ 61,
80; eoo also §§ 63, 82, 86,

Motion to
Costs on A.ppeal.
from the order
his motion to
foes and costs on appeal
dismissed since the motion
called upon the
on the same
facts.
Cal.2d 38, 44
[162 P.2d 8].)
out (ante, p.
a motion to vacate
from au order
328-229) an
order does not lie where the grounds on which
an
to have the order vacated existed beand were available on
therefrom. (Colbert
, 28 Cal.2d
281 [8] [169 P.2d 633} .)
Cause
Action Based on Fraud
that she is a Putative
I further agree
with the
p
that since recovery is to be
allowed on the view that defendant is estopped to deny the
validity of the
there can be no recovery for fraud
the
or as a
wife. She cannot both
eat her cake and have it too.
Defendant's
to Divide his Property with Plainancl to
her Children. I dissent from
the HV.lCUHE;

said

as

aforesaid
prior

from
their [plainthat if she
her
children.
the family ..• [T]he
of time . . . and that
asked her to tell
a false reason why she
him and a false statement of the defendant's
as a result of these various proposals, she told
of the defendant, the proposal that
had been made to her in its
and asked her husband whether he
wouldn't reform so that they could continue the marriage .•• [I]nstead
of taking the
her husband admitted his incompetence, that
he didn't feel
would
an economic success . • . and he frankly sugthat she take advantage of the offer made
the defendant and
a divorce from him.
''That she reported those facts to the defendant, who then instructed
her with regard to the kind of
settlement
she should
have, and the
have with
husband.
'' 'I'hat he
her
she wouldn't need to retain her interest
in her home . . . He told her she wouldn't need
''He instructed her she wouldn't need support
children because he would support the children .••
''That thereafter he instructed her what Rt1tnr'l1Av to go to and made
prior arrangements with that
to
the divorce snit,
her the money to pay for the
action,
that she reported
to him on every sillgle stage
divoree aetion ••• ,.

the trial court found ''that on a number of occaflions prior to
threatened to divorce
Robert
final decision
to these
and
that it could
that defendant made two
to
divide his
and
children and that
l"'"Hn<.L~ went through the
ceremony in reliance
on the promises made after she had obtained her interlocutory
decree of divorce and not upon the
which induced
her to obtain the interlocutory decree. In my estimation it
cannot fairly be said, as the majority opinion says (ante, p.
225) that "the evidence was susceptible of an interpretation
that the divorce from Robert was merely incidental to the
agreement"; ratber, the procuring of the interlocutory decree
was an integral and essential part of the agreement. This
case is not like Howard v. Adarns (1940), 16 Cal.2d 253, 256257 [2] [105 P.2d 971, 130 A.L.R. 1003]. There plaintiff
had already decided on a divorce when defendant, plaintiff's
aunt, promised to support plaintiff and her children in consideration of plaintiff's obtaining the divorce in Nevada. Here
it cannot fairly be said that there was any evidence that
plaintiff had definitely decided to divorce Seymon before
defendant's promises induced such decision. Nor is this case
like Hill v. Hill (1943), 23 Cal.2d 82, 86-94 [142 P.2d 417]
[property settlement between parties who had separated;
before the making of the agreement the husband had sued for
divorce and the wife had cross-complained for separate maintenance], or Kreiger v. Bulpitt (1953), 40 Cal.2d 97, 100-101
[2, 3] [251 P.2d 673] [contingent fee contract to defend in
"At the second hearing plaintiff testified as follows: About four
months prior to plaintiff's obtaining a divorce defendant "told me . . .
I had to divorce my husband and he would give me all security and
everything what a woman wanted, and for the children an education . . .
[H] e would give mG everything and would make me a full fledged partner
if I would eonsider marriage to him. . . . Then he called me and called
me and repeated his offer all the time for quite a while until I finally
told him I would talk to my husband and tell him what he had suggested . . . . " Plaintiff disenssed the proposal with Seymon, and told
defendant that she had given Seymon ''three months time to improve our
condition.'' She finally decided on a divorce from her husband, informed
defendant, and defendant made arrangement~ for the divorce.
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which had been instituted before the makI would
the trial court in its
should be nonsuited as to her cause of
action based on defendant's oral agreement.
As to the statement in the
opinion (ante, pp. 225226) that ''Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to
the
that
believed in
faith in
of her
to defendant 6 between March
and
at least after she consulted
her attorney in this action on March 20, 1952. '' I would note
that defendant cannot effectively assert a lack of good faith
belief of plaintiff in the validity of her marriage before
March 23, 1952, because defendant in his notice of appeal in
the main action stated that "Defendant specifically does not
appeal from that portion of the Judgment herein adjudging
that plaintiff was the putative wife of defendant ... during
the period March 17, 1951, to and including March 23, 1952."
The fact that plaintiff was advised by her attorney on March
1952, that the validity of her marriage "lay in the field
unsettled law" does not preclude her from invoking the
doctrine of estoppeL
Relief under Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the Order Taxing Cost of Transcript and Appealability
Order Denying Relief under Section 473. I concur in the
holding (ante, pp. 226-228) that the order taxing the cost of a
daily reporter's transcript may be corrected under section
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure (unless it is shown on
reconsideration of the order taxing costs that, as defendant
argued in the trial court and suggests on appeal, the minute
order, "A daily transcript is ordered," did not correctly
reflect the order of the court). Further, I agree with the
holding (ante, pp. 228-229) that the order denying plaintiff relief under section 473 is appealable.
Maintenance of the Action for Abuse of Process. I agree in
part with the reasons advanced in the majority opinion
(ante, pp. 229-233) for the holding that plaintiff can recover
in her cross-action for abuse of process. Not discussed in the
majority opinion (or by the parties) are the questions whether
the action for abuse of pro<cc"s is for injury to property or
for personal injury and whether, if it is for personal injury,
it can be maintained
a wife (or one who by successfully
4
This fact could be a
1100ght.. (See Civ. Code, §

one, at least as to some of the :relief
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person.)
the rule of this state that one spouse can
sue the other for
to
but not for injury to
person. (Peters v.
, 156 Cal. 32, 36 [103 P.
219, 23 L.R.A.N.S.
not allowed];
Paulus v. Bauder
), 106
591-592 [1]
in automobile accident sus[235 P.2d 422] [action for
tained during
; Cubbison v.
Cubbison (1946), 73
P.2d 387]
[action for
in automobile accident not allowed].) The
rule of
for
torts was recently
applied in Watson v. Watson (1952), 39 Cal.2d 305 [246 P.2d
19]. It is there held that
was estopped to deny the
validity of a Nevada divorce which he had
and in
reliance on which he had gone
ceremony
with defendant
307 [2, 3]).
it is further held,
plaintiff could not sue defendant
prosecution
even though the
and defendant was
bigamous and void.
If intcrspousa1
to maintain an action for personal
tort is to remain the rule
this
then that rule should
apply here. If
to invoke the doctrine of
in order to pursue a
maintenance action, it
is proper that that doctrine should
in heJ" tort action.
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, supra,

to reexamine the common law view of interspousal immunity and
it to this case, rather
than distort
to her feelings
None of the reasons
which have been
the common law view
apply to this action. As this
demonstrates, any conjugal
of this
has long since been
disrupted. Certainly there can be no thought of collusion
The court should not decline to enterbetween these
tain a meritorious action
a spouse (or one who, like
defendant
that he is a spouse) becausf'
of the dubious
that in some future case trifling
domestic difficulties may become the subject of litigation.
It has been
that because recovery by plaintiff
"spouse" for
injuries inflicted by defendant
uspouse" would be
property (Flores v. Brown
(1952), 39 CaL2d 622, 630 [8} [248 P.2d 922]; Zaragosa v.
Craven ( 1949), 33 CaL2d 315, 320 [2] [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.
2d 461] ) 7 "defendant spouse would then [if recovery from
him was permitted] in effect be taking the money out of one
• A spouse's cause of action for personal injuries, it may be noted, is
treated differently from other
in the event of the
death of the other
, 43 Cal.2d 254, 258
[ 4] 1273 P.2d
v. Washington (1956),
47 Cal.2<l 249, 252
By statutory
to actions commenced and
date of the act, all damages
eanses of action arising
in
civil action for personal injuries are the
awarded a married
separate
such married
(Stats. 1957, chap. 2334,
§ 163,5 and
Civ, Code, 917le,)
adding

rule of the Peters
case
CaL
should come from the Legislature
v.
(1951), supra, 106
589,
592; Cubbison
), snpra, 73 CaLApp.2d 437,
438) are not
The rule was
formulated
by this court in reliance upon a now outmoded common law
rule, and if this court becomes convinced that the rule is
unwise it should
fit to
it. (See Brown v. Gosser
(1953,
, 262 S.W.2d
43 A.L.R.2d 626, 631.)
incu1·red in the Claim and
uun'"'''""' in the Cross-Action
Abuse of
Process. I agree with the
refusal (ante, p. 233)
to extend the normal rule that
's fees are not recoverable aB
or otherwise in the absence of express
authority or statute or contract.
In my view the
should he
of as follows :
In L.A.
the order
fees
and costs
trial should be reversed; ~"""''""-""
appeal
from ''All orders . . incident or
to the aforesaid
orders'' should be dismissed.
In L.A.
defendant's
from the order denying
his motion to vacate the order that he pay attorney's fees
and costs on
should be dismissed.
In L. A.
the order that defendant pay counsel fees
and costs should be affirmed; the order denying plaintiff's
request for support
should be reversed.
In L. A.
the order
motion fo.r relief (under Code Civ.
the order taxing
costs should be reversed;
from ''All orders
. . . incident or
to
aforesaid order" should be dismissed.
the main
In L.A.
I would reverse the judg-

the order as denies
alishould be reversed.
~A~+;;A~ of the order which denies
but sinee
has not
this
in her briefs this portion of the order should be affirmed.
concurred.
The
of
Sol Carl
was denied Novemb(or
1957.
were of the
that the
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[1] Pleading-Supplemental Pleadings.--So-called "amended" complaints are
where they allege facts
material to the case
after the former complaint.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 464.)
[2]

[1] See Cal.Jur.,

McK. Dig. References:
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 449;
Estates, § 551; [6] Decedents'

